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COMMENT
codicil to will has nothing to do with admissibility to probate but with
quite different matters: incorporation by reference and the related
doctrine of republication.
One further matter should be mentioned before we may sit back
and hope that In re Whittier will be overruled: the unfortunate refusal
of the court to settle the effect of Section 1414. True, it found it "not
necessary" to decide, but the language in the concluding paragraph of
the opinion is disturbing "24 "Since the codicil in this case was neither
attached to the will nor made any reference whatever to it, the Schirmer
case is controlling, and the document was therefore not entitled to be
admitted to probate." The opinion itself italicized the word "attached,"
the precise requirement of the statute and not a part of the Schirmer
rule at all; does this mean that the court is committed to the attach-
ment rule? Is reference enough, or must both reference and attach-
ment exist to win probate for a codicil? At least half of the quandary
could have been avoided had the court chosen to take a stand. Either
Section 1414 is applicable and decisive or it is not, and it is a matter of
real consequence to the profession to know Perhaps it was not neces-
sary to decide the question for the purpose of disposing of In re Whit-
tier; if so, it should not have been used as an additional, or at least a
make-weight argument for the result. An opimon has a precedent-
making function which is at least as important as its function of dispos-
ing of the case itself, and such temporizing, albeit only a careless choice
of words, compounds confusion.
2, Op. cit. p. 802.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE
DEAD MAN STATUTE
DOUGLAS A. WILSON
The "Dead Man Statutes" of the several states, which exclude
testimony by interested parties in certain cases, stand in the unique
position of being condemned by all the modern writers on the law of
evidence.' Yet this exception to the abrogation of the common law
rule against testimony by interested parties still survives in the majority
I Wigmore attacks it with characteristic vigor: "As a matter of policy, this
survival of a part of the now discarded interest-disqualification is deplorable in
every respect; for it is based on a fallacious and exploded principle, it leads to
as much or more false decision than it prevents, and it encumbers the profession
with a profuse mass of barren quibbles over the interpretation of mere words."
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) 697, § 578.
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of the states,' and furthermore, the courts are generally agreed that the
statutes are to be strictly construed. However, in the application to a
particular set of facts, such as whether the interested survivor may
deny that a transaction took place, or whether the statute is applicable
to proceedings in probate or contest of a will, the decisions are in hope-
less conflict, due more or less to the phraseology of the particular
statute. Since no other state has a statute closely resembling that of
Washington,' extra-state precedents are of slight value. It remains for
us to look to the recent decisions of the Washington court to determine
the applicability of the statute and thus perhaps better judge whether
the widespread criticism of the statute is warranted.
I.
TESTIMONY SUPPORTING INFERENCE OF NO TRANSACTION
One of the most significant developments in the last ten or fifteen
years, as to R.EM. REv STAT. Section I2II,' is found in Martin v.
" such a statute destroys the possibility of collecting honest claims by the
living. It may prevent perjury of a claimant but it does not prevent subornation
of perjury by a claimant and perjury by witnesses." Comment, MoDEL CODE or
EVIDENCE (1942) 92.
"So long as legislatures and courts continue to disregard realities by assuming
that perjury can be eliminated by rules of evidence and that it is wiser to do
m3ustice than risk deception by possible perjurers, so long will absurdities such
as these continue to shock common sense, and no amount of judicial rational-
lization can give them the appearance of wisdom." Morgan, The Law of Evidence,
1941-1945 (1946) 59 HLv. L. REv. 481 at 512.
"The phrase E'where one man's lips are closed by death, the other's must be
closed by law'J has a specious equity which conceals a baneful potency for
injustice. It is a sin against the light when, in the name of solicitude for the
dead, the law permits one set of living folks to cut off another's claim without a
fair hearing." McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evzdence (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 511.
2 Such exclusionary statutes are in effect in all but six states. 2 WGMORE,
EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 578.
S Comment (1926) 1 WAsH. L. REv. 21.
"Not Excluded on Ground of Interest-Eception-Transaction With Person
Since Deceased, No person offered as a witness shall be excluded from giving
evidence by reason of his interest in the event of the action, as a party thereto
or otherwise; but such interest may be shown to affect his credibility; Provided,
however, that in an action or proceeding where the adverse party sues or defends
as executor, administrator, or legal representative of any deceased person, or
as deriving right or title by, through or from any deceased person, or as
the guardian or conservator of the estate of any insane person, or of any minor
under the age of fourteen (14) years, then a party in interest or to the record,
shall not be admitted to testify in his own behalf as to any transaction had by
him with, or any statement made to him, or in his presence, by any such deceased
or insane person, or by any such minor under the age of fourteen (14) years:
Provided further, that this exclusion shall not apply to parties of record who
sue or defend in a representative or fiduciary capacity, and who have no other
or further interest in the action." REM. REV. STAT. § 1211.
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Shaen.5 This case involved the question of delivery of a deed, shown to
have been in the possession of the decedent prior to her death. The
executor of the estate was defendant in the action. The.appellant hus-
band was not permitted to testify that he did not deliver a quitclaim
deed to his wife, on the ground that the appellant, being a party in inter-
est, would not be permitted under the provisions of the Washington
statute to testify in his own behalf as to any transaction had by him
with the decedent. Neither was he permitted to testify that he had not
withdrawn the deed from his safe-deposit box (where he testified he
placed it immediately after its execution), that he did not know that
the deed had been withdrawn from the safe-deposit box; or, that he did
not see the deed again until the time of the first trial.
The court relied principally on the New York case of Boyd v. Boyd.'
Here the executor contended that the plaintiff had forged the deceased's
signature, and plaintiff attempted to testify that he did not. The court
held that such testimony was inadmissible, saying in part:'
"The statute may be as effectively violated by testimony of a negative charac-
ter as by affirmative proof of what actually took place."
The Washington court also cited O'Connor v. Sldtter s which in-
volved an action to recover on certain notes bearing the endorsement
of the defendant's decedent. The defendant widow alleged fraud on
the part of plaintiff in obtaining the notes. The plaintiff was allowed to
testify that the defendant, widow of the deceased, was not present when
certain notes were endorsed by the decedent, the court saying that this
did not constitute testimony relating to a statement made by or trans-
action had with the deceased. However, it was further held that the
plaintiff could not testify as to whether the notes had been changed
since he received them from the deceased inasmuch as this, in the
court's opinion, was an indirect way of ascertaining their condition
when received from the hands of the deceased and was "a palpable
attempt to evade the statute."'
The court might better have relied on Dems v. Metzenbaum10 in
support of its position. This was an action upon a promissory note
against one of two makers. While the defendant conceded his separate
liability on the note, his community resisted upon the ground that de-
5Martin v. Shaen, 126 Wash. Dec. 324, 173 P (2d) 968 (1946)
6 Boyd v. Boyd, 164 N. Y. 284, 58 N. E. 118 (1900)
7 d. at 121.
8O'Connor v. Slatter, 48 Wash. 493, 93 Pac. 1078 (1908)
'id. at 496.
20Dens v. Metzenbaum, 124 Wash. 86, 213 Pac. 453 (1923)
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fendant Metzenbaum was an accommodation maker and thus the
community received no consideration. The instrument upon which the
executor relied indicated on its face a relationship of co-maker and
payee between the defendant and the deceased. The defendant was not
permitted to rebut this presumption by testifying that such a relation-
ship did not in fact exist. It was pointed out that:"
"Manifestly, the only purpose of the proferred testimony was to show that
Metzenbaum was an accommodation maker of the note. Whether he was or was
not so depends upon the transaction he had with the payee of the note, and to
prove this in the manner attempted would be to prove it by indirection, a manner
of proof the cases cited forbid."
In Martin v. Shaen, the executor relied on a presumption of valid
delivery, based on the fact that the grantee had the deed in her pos-
session at the time of her death. This, of course, is a rebuttable pre-
sumption. There was no direct testimony as to delivery of the deed.
Yet we find the husband precluded from rebutting the presumption
raised by possession by not being allowed to testify that he never
delivered the deed, or further, that he had never taken the deed from
the safe-deposit box. The holding of the case goes beyond Boyd v.
Boyd in not permitting collateral testimony which could support even
an inference of no transaction with the deceased. The rule that the law
will not permit an adverse party to prove by indirection through his own
testimony that which he may not testify to directly is carried to its
extreme.
It should be noted that in the Martin case the court made no refer-
ence to Bardsley v. Truax,2 where on the issue concerning the delivery
of a deed by the decedent, the court held it proper to permit the sur-
vivor to testify to the fact that he had had the deed in his possession
since its date as affording the basis of an inference of delivery The
difficulty of harmonizing this holding with those in the O'Connor,
Metzenbaum, and Skaen cases is obvious, because clearly the survivor
in the Bardsley case was allowed to do indirectly what he could not
have done directly
The object or purpose of the statute is to guard against the tempta-
tion to give false testimony on the part of the surviving party and to
put the parties to the suit upon terms of equality Since one party is
precluded from testifying by reason of death or insanity, it is believed
'" Id. at 89; cited: Spencer v Terrel, 17 Wash. 514, 50 Pac. 468 (1897), Kline
v Stem, 30 Wash. 189, 70 Pac. 235 (1902)
12 Bardsley v Truax, 64 Wash. 400, 116 Pac. 1075 (1911)
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only just to deny the other party the advantage of giving is uncontra-
dicted account of the transaction. 8 However, in many instances, the
exclusion of the right to deny a transaction would seem to give an
undue advantage to the decedent's estate and to place an undue burden
on the survivor. 4
Running through the many cases presenting the problem, one finds
a recognition by the court that an important consideration in deter-
mining whether offered testimony concerns a transaction with the
deceased is whether or not the deceased, were he alive and present,
could contradict the offered testimony However, it seems clear that
tis test is not entirely conclusive. If it clearly appears that the de-
ceased could not contradict the proffered testimony, it is obvious that
it does not concern a transaction with the deceased." On the other
hand, even though it appears that the deceased could contradict, it
does not necessarily follow that the offered testimony concerns a
transaction with the deceased. It may or may not.16
The "Dead Man Statute" is applicable both to an action against the
estate and to one by the estate. In the first instance, the interested
party is precluded from testifying directly that a transaction with the
deceased did take place or from testifying to collateral facts which
lead to an inference of such transaction. In the second instance, the
statute as applied precludes negative testimony, whether consisting
of a direct demal that a transaction did in fact take place, or testimony
wuch by inference would lead to the same conclusion. It appears,
therefore, impossible for the interested party to introduce personal
testimony which would tend to rebut a presumption in favor of the
estate.
It is in tins latter category, where the action is brought by the estate,
that a strict application of the rule works the greatest hardship. If it is
deemed inadvisable to completely abrogate the statute by legislation,
the most patently unjust results could be eliminated by limiting the
application of the statute to situations where claims are brought by the
interested party aganst the estate.'7 Then the problem of Martin v.
Shaen would never arise.
"8 3.oNs oN EvmENcE (4th ed. 1938) § 773.
16 Tozvn sNS, TBE CazsERLAY=E TkAL, EvmENcE (2d ed. 1936) § 308.
2' Piles v. Bovee, 168 Wash. 538, 12 P. (2d) 914 (1932)
10 Ah How v. Furth, 13 Wash. 550 (1896); Bardsley v. Truax, 64 Wash. 400, 116
Pac. 1075 (1911)
17 In Mississippi, an interested witness is incompetent to testify "to establish
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
II.
PROBATE AND WILL CONTEST PROCEEDINGS
As to the applicability of the "Dead Man Statute" to probate and
will contest proceedings, the courts of states having such statutes are
again in conflict. Here, too, the decisions are predicated upon statutes
materially different in one or more aspects. In some jurisdictions pro-
bate proceedings are especially withdrawn from the operation of the
disqualifying statute 8 and in others, are expressly included. 9 In those
jurisdictions in which there is no such statutory reference made, the
weight of authority supports the contention that the probating of a will
and the contest of a will are proceedings zn rem and that heirs, devisees,
legatees, and distributees are competent to testify notwithstanding the
inhibition of the statute as to parties in interest.2" It is held that the
estate as an entity is not a party in interest, since the effect of such
proceedings is neither to increase or diminish the estate, but only to
settle the distribution of the estate.2 The executor or administrator
of the estate therefore acts only as an intermediary for those who are
the real parties in interest, t.e., those who claim a share in the distn-
bution.
The minority, on the other hand, holds the estate a party to the
proceedings and thus the interested survivors are incompetent to testify
These jurisdictions have been recently reinforced by the addition,
through a switch of allegiance, of the Washington court.2" In re Wind's
Estate involved a proceeding initiated by the legal representative of
August Wind, a deceased person, to prove the destroyed will of Mr.
Wind. The trial court found that August Wind had made a will, but
that, shortly before his death, the will was destroyed at the request
his (her) own or assigned claim against the estate of a deceased person." REx.
CODE (1906) § 1917.
28 Note: 51 L. R. A. (N. a.) 206.
19 An interested person, or one in privity therewith " shall not be qualified
for the purpose of this section, to testify in his own behalf or interest, or m
behalf of the party succeeding to his title or interest, to personal transactions
or communications with the donee of a power of appointment in an action or
proceeding for the probate of a will, which exercises or attempts to exercise a
power of appointment granted by the will of the donor of such power, or in
an action or proceeding involving the construction of the will of the donee
after its admission to probate." N. Y. Civ. Pr. Act § 347, as amended to Sept.
1, 1935.
20 In re Shapter's Estate, 35 Colo. 57, 85 Pac. 688, 6 L. R. A. (N. s.) 575 (1905)
21 Henry v. Hall, 106 Aia. 84, 17 So. 187 (1895); Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463,
94 N. W 705, 62 L. R. A. 383 (1903), 28 R. C. L. 511, § 98.
22 In re Wind's Estate, 1.27 Wash. Dec. 395 (1947) (En banc hearing)
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of the testator. Mrs. Wind was allowed to testify that about January
II, 1945 her husband handed her his will, which had been executed on
the previous day, and asked her to burn it, and that she had complied
with his request. Mrs. Wind was personally and financially interested
in seeing to it that the will be invalidated, in that she did not take
under the will but would take if the husband was found to have died
intestate. It was held that the testimony of the wife should have been
excluded under RIu. Rxv STAT. Section 1211. The court said in part: 8
"There can be no difference between securing the allowance of a claim against
the estate by testifying to a transaction with the deceased and defeating the
probate of a will, by testifying to transactions such as testified to in this case.
In each case, the witness stands to profit, not by the merits of his contention but
because his evidence cannot be denied."
The Washington court, in receding from its prior position, found it
necessary to directly overrule only one case, In re Findley's Estate,"
in which it was squarely held that Ri~. REv STAT Section 1211 was not
applicable to proceedings to establish a lost will. It was there pointed
out that the weight of authority was in accord, and the court went
on to say-2
"Tlus is not an action wherein an adverse party sues or defends as executor,
administrator, or legal representative of a deceased person with reference to some
clain or demand which arises out of any transaction with the deceased during
his lifetime and wnch existed at his death. It is a judicial inquiry as to whether
the instrument offered is a last will and testament of the deceased and entitled
to probate as such. The primary object of the inquiry is to determine whether the
deceased intended that the devolution of his property should be controlled by
the laws of descent or by the alleged will, and nothing pertaining to claims
against the estate is in any way involved."
A literal interpretation of REm. PEv STAT. Section 12 11 supports the
conclusions reached In re Wind's Estate. The statute refers to "an
action or proceeding" which leaves the door open for its application to
probate or will contest proceedings. Similarly, Section 1211 does not by
its terms make the exclusion applicable only in the event of "claims
SZd, at 402.
2' 199 Wash. 669, 93 P.(2d) 318 (1939) The Washington court had stated that
the exclusion rule did not apply either to will contests or applications for the
probate of a will in three other cases: In re Anderson's Estate, 114 Wash. 591,
195 Pac. 994 (1921), In re Zelinsky's Estate, 130 Wash. 165, 227 Pac. 507 (1924),
Jones v. Peabody, 182 Wash. 148, 45 P (2d) 915, 100 A. L. R. 64 (1935) However,
the court pointed out that its statement in each instance was dicta because it
was not necessary to a decision in the case.
25 AxN. CAS. (1914 A) 982; 28 R. C. L. 510-512; 5 NIcoLs, APPLIED EVIDENCE 4467,
§42.
20 In re Findley's Estate, 199 Wash. 669, 93 P (2d) 318 (1939)
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against the estate,"2 ' which suggests that the rationale of the court in
In re Findley's Estate was incorrect.
In reversing its former holding, the court employed clear and un-
ambiguous language, stating that Section 1211 applies to proceedings
for the probate or contest of wills in which an interested party seeks
to testify to "any transaction had with, or statement made by, or in
the presence of any deceased or insane person." '28 Under the holding,
therefore, it would seem that an interested party will be held competent
to testify in a probate proceeding only where it is determined that his
testimony does not concern a "transaction" or conversation with the
deceased.
The court distinguished the case In re Anderson's Estate' on the
above ground, holding that testimony by an interested party as to the
mental condition of the testator could not be termed a transaction with
one since deceased. This is in line with the weight of authority that
such testimony is mere opinion which could not be denied by the
testator were he alive. 0 The Washington court, in the Anderson case,
however, would seem to have gone even farther in also permitting the
facts on which the opinion is based, including conversations had with
the testator, to be admitted in evidence. In re Wind's Estate stands
squarely for the proposition that Section 1 2 11 will permit no testimony
as to any "transaction or conversation" with the deceased, regardless
of whether it be a probate proceeding or any other action in which the
estate is an adverse party Therefore, although the court purported to
distinguish the Anderson case, it would appear that the Wind case in
effect directly overrules the Anderson case insofar as the admissibility
of conversations with the deceased for any purpose whatsoever is
concerned.
Aside from applying a strict interpretation of the statute, the decision
in In re Wind's Estate, in identifying the purpose of, or reason behind,
the statute, would seem to be both logical and correct. Certainly the
temptation to commit perjury is just as great on the part of one seeking
2T Under the mIississippi Statute providing that one cannot testify to establish
against the estate of a deceased person a claim which originated during his
lifetime, it has been held that a wife who, in the absence of a will, will inherit
all her husband's property, is incompetent to testify as to his testamentary
capacity. Whitehead v. Kirk, 104 Miss. 776, 61 So. 737 (1913)
21 In re Wind's Estate, supra note 22 at 402.
29In re Anderson's Estate, 114 Wash. 591, 195 Pac. 994 (1921)
30 Jewett v. Budwick, 145 Wash. 405, 260 Pac. 247 (1927), noted in (1928) 37
YALE L. J. 827.
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a greater share in the distribution of an estate as on the part of one
who is an alleged creditor of the estate. In either instance, the deceased
is equally incapacitated to make a defense or denial.
It is undeniably true that the effect of a proceeding to probate a will,
to prove a lost will, or to contest a will is neither to increase or dinumsh
the size of the estate. But should this fact alone operate to render the
statute inapplicable? It should be remembered that the right of an
individual to make a will and to insure distribution of his property in
accordance with his wishes is a most zealously protected statutory
right.3" To hold that the estate of the deceased is m effect not a party
in interest to a proceeding in probate would seem to be wholly incon-
sistent with the protection of Ins right to determine distribution of his
property after death. For example, A makes a will disposing of all his
property to B and C. Later he attempts to revoke the will which would
operate to leave all his property to C. After A's death, B attempts to
prove the partially destroyed will and offers to testify to certain con-
versations with the deceased which would tend to establish that A did
not wish to destroy the will. Surely, it cannot be said that the executor,
representing the deceased's estate, is not an adverse party m relation
to such testimony The true test of the competency of a witness should
be determined by whether he would gain or lose by a decree setting
aside a will or admitting a will to probate. Though ostensibly a contest
between the heirs at law and the devisees and legatees, the action
directly affects the rights of the deceased and the interests of the
estate. Rights of the deceased in regard to the disposal of his properties
after death should be granted as great a degree of protection as would
his property interests in the event of a claim agaihst the estate.
III.
CONCLUSION
The recent developments pertaining to RPm. Rv STAT. Section 1211
clearly indicate that the Washington court is presently committed to a
strict interpretation of this disqualifying statute. It is equally clear that
complete abrogation, assuming for the moment that such a step would
be advisable, is virtually an impossibility There appears to be a defin-
ite lreponderance of opinion among local practitioners that cross-
31 In -re McComb's Estate, 164 Wash. 339, 2 P (2d) 692 (1931); In re Little. Joe,
165 Wash. 628, 5 P. (2d) 995 (1931)
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examination standing alone is not sufficient protection," that the statute
is generally wholesome in effect, and that the good it accomplishes
undoubtedly outweighs whatever hardships it works."8 But the latter
test is hardly a satisfactory basis for judging and condoning legislation.
While granting that the statute may provide a necessary safeguard
against fraud and perjury, it should nevertheless be possible to retain
those essential safeguards and at the same time modify and liberalize
the statute which a respectable minority of states have done.' The
most workable of these "modifications" would seem to be that of New
Hampshire where such testimony is excluded, except when it "appears
to the court that injustice may be done without the testimony of the
party))85
From a study of recent decisions in this jurisdiction, it is submitted
that the court, under the statute as it now exists, has correctly applied
the exclusionary rule to such situations as were presented m Martin
v. Shaen and In re Wind's Estate. Nevertheless, there is much to be said
82The opponents of exclusionary statutes feel that more trust should be
placed on cross-examination. "In the early development of our jurisprudence
the testimony of all interested witnesses was excluded; but experience gradually
led to the conclusion that the restriction should be relaxed and more reliance
should be placed upon the efficacy of our process of investigating truth. Cross-
examination, for instance, has been found to be well calculated to uncover a
fraudulent scheme concocted by an interested party; and where that has failed,
the scrutiny to which the testimony of a witness is subjected by the court and
by the jury has proven efficacious in discovering the truth, to say nothing of
the power of circumstantial evidence to discredit the mere oral statement of an
interested witness." Taft, Comments on Will Contests in New York (1921) 30
YALE L. J. 593, 605.
08 "We should not forget that the statute interposes no obstacle to the estab-
lishment of a claim based upon written contract, and under present day
conditions, it is probably true that the vast majority of good faith contracts and
business transactions are evidenced by some writing or memorandum." Falknor,
The American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence (1943) 18 WAsH. L. REV.
228, 231.
31 In Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island, interested survivors are
now entirely competent, and declarations, whether written or oral, of the de-
cedent are likewise admissible. In Connecticut, the trial judge has the privilege
to comment on the weight and credibility of the evidence; and lawyers fre-
quently pointed to this fact as a controlling reason for not advising additional
safeguards. MORGAN AND OTHERs, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1927) 35.
In New Mexico, Oregon and Virginia, the interested party may testify, but his
testimony uncorroborated is insufficient to support a recovery. This modifica-
tion is perhaps of limited value, since if there is substantial corroborating
testimony, the testimony of the survivor will not be necessary. TorPIaNs, Ts
CHAMBERLAYNE TRIAL EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1936) § 320.
" New Hampshire: N. H. PuB. LAWs (1926) c. 336, § 28; Arizona has adopted
a somewhat similar statute, allowing the witness to testify "if required by the
court." ARiz. REv. STAT. (1913) Civil Code § 1678.
RECENT CASES 221
for an attempt, by modification of the statute, to soften the harshness
of the present rule without losing the salutary results of its general
application. 8
, "8f fault be found, and criticism justified, the rule should be modified by
legislative action or court rule which applies generally, and not by judicial
legislation against a party in a particular case." Wright v. Wilson, 154 F (2d) 616
(C. C. A. 3d 1946)
